St. Mary's Law Journal
Volume 1

Number 1

Article 6

3-1-1969

Continuing Problems of Travel and Transportation.
Leslie H. Williams Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, and the Conflict of Laws Commons

Recommended Citation
Leslie H. Williams Jr., Continuing Problems of Travel and Transportation., 1 ST. MARY'S L.J. (1969).
Available at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol1/iss1/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the St. Mary's Law Journals at Digital Commons at St.
Mary's University. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. Mary's Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons at St. Mary's University. For more information, please contact sfowler@stmarytx.edu.

Williams: Continuing Problems of Travel and Transportation.

CONTINUING PROBLEMS OF TRAVEL
AND TRANSPORTATION
LESLIE H. WILLIAMS, JR.

I. INTRODUCTION
The Texas Workmen's Compensation Act seeks to protect the employee by assuring him of a speedy and inexpensive means of applying
for relief and by providing adequate compensation for injuries sustained in the course of his employment.' The act is based on the theory
that the burden of industrial accidents should properly be borne by
industry as a part of the cost of production. 2 One of the most perplexing questions in workmen's compensation litigation is: was the workman injured while acting within the scope of his employment?8 Travel
and transportation cases present a recurring problem in determining
whether an injury was sustained while in the course of employment.
The increasing number of travel-oriented injuries involving scope
of employment resulted in an amendment 4 to the Workmen's Compensation Act which restricts the interpretation in this area. The enactment provided the courts with guidelines to follow in deciding
course and scope of employment injuries under the facts of each particular case. 5
This comment will examine this feature of the Texas Workmen's
Compensation Act, particularly with relation to the scope of employment problem. Special emphasis will be given to recent Texas cases
interpreting the transportation and travel amendment.
II.

DEVELOPMENT

OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

ACTS

"Workmen's compensation is not an outgrowth of the common law
or of employers' liability legislation; it is the expression of an entirely

new social principle having its origins in nineteenth century Germany." In the United States at the end of the nineteenth century, the
1 TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN., arts. 8306-8309; Woolsey v. Panhandle Refining Company,
131 Tex. 449, 116 S.W.2d 675 (1938); Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York v.
McLaughlin, 134 Tex. 613, 135 S.W.2d 955 (1940).

2 Miller's Mutual Casualty Company v. Hoover, 285 S.W. 863 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1921,
jdgmt adopted); Moore v. Lumberman's Reciprocal Association, 258 S.W. 1051 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1924, jdgmt adopted); General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corpo-

ration v. Evans, 201 S.W. 705 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1918, no writ); Southern Surety
Company v. Inabnit, 1 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1927, no writ); Federal
Surety Company v. Ragle, 40 S.W.2d 63 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1931, jdgmt adopted).
3 21 Sw. L.J. 81 (1967).

4 Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN., art. 8309, § lb (1957).
5 Wynn v. Southern Surety Company, 26 S.W.2d 691 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1930, writ
ref'd); Cercy v. Trader's & General, 142 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1940, writ
ref'd).
6 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law 33, § 5.00 (1968).
89
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coincidence of increasing industrial injuries and decreasing remedies
produced a situation ripe for radical change.7 Legislation throughout
the United States used the German system as a guide to the direction
which efforts at reform might take. 8 Various investigations ensued
which ultimately resulted in the drafting of a Uniform Workmen's
Compensation Law.9 Although numerous state acts which followed
were not uniform, the progress of the investigations did much to set a
fundamental pattern of legislation.' ° In 1913, the Texas Legislature
passed the Workmen's Compensation Act" modeled after a Massachusetts statute. 2 The law was amended in 1917,13 borrowing freely from
various statutes and embracing features not found in any other act; in
14
effect it constituted a substitute statute.
III.

PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW

It is the intent of the workmen's compensation law to protect the
employee against the risk or hazard taken in order to perform his master's tasks. 15 Any injury sustained as a result of such risk or hazard
must be sustained in the course of employment' 6 and originate in the
8
17
work of the employer to be compensable. By statutory provision
course of employment includes all injuries, of every kind and character, that deal with and originate in the work, business, trade, or profession of the employer which are sustained by an employee while engaged in or about the furtherance of the affairs or business of his employer, whether the injuries occurred on the employer's premises or
elsewhere. Basically, the judicial tests under section 1 of article 8309
have remained constant for more than forty years.' 9 To recover for an
7 Id. See § 5.20, p. 37.
8 Id.
9 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law 37, § 5.20. (1968); Boyd, Compensation for
Injuries to Workmen, pp. 17-22 (1913).
10 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law 37, § 5.20 (1968).
11 Gen. Laws 1913, 33d Leg. ch. 179, p. 429.
12 Wm. Cameron & Company v. Gamble, 216 S.W. 459 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1919,
no writ).
13 Gen. Laws 1917, 35th Leg. ch. 103, p. 269.
14 Win. Cameron & Company v. Gamble, 216 S.W. 459 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1919,
no writ).
15 Pace v. Appanoose County, 184 Iowa 498, 168 N.W. 916, 918 (1918); Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Grammer, 157 S.W.2d 701, 704 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1941, writ ref'd w.oam.); Liberty Mutual v. Nelson, 142 Tex. 370, 178 S.W.2d 514, 516
(1944).
16 TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN., art. 8306, § 3b (1917) provides:

If an employe who has not given notice of his claim of common law or statutory
rights of action, or who has given such notice and waived the same, sustains an injury in the course of his employment, he shall be paid compensation by the association as hereinafter provided, if his employer is a subscriber at the time of the
injury.
17 Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN., art. 8309, § 1 (1959).
18Id.
19 North River Insurance Company v. Hubbard, 391 F.2d 863, 865 (5th Cir. 1968).
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injury, the employee must show two factors: (1) that at the time of injury, he was engaged in or about the furtherance of his employer's affairs or business, and (2) the injury was of a kind and character that
dealt with and originated in the employer's work, business, trade or
profession. 20 The wording of the Texas statute is different from that
of the English Acts of 1897 and 1906 and most American statutes,
which provide for compensation in case of personal injury by accident
''arising out of and in the course of the employment." The phrase
"having to do with and originating in the work," is in effect the same
as the expression "arising out of the employment," 21 though the statute
does not use these specific terms. 22 Liability is not based on the act or
omission of the employer, 23 nor on the absence of fault on the part of
the employee, 24 rather it is based on the existence of the employeremployee relationship. 25 A compensable injury, therefore, must not
only be received in the course of employment but must also arise out
of the employment. Neither requirement alone is sufficient.26
As a general rule, an employee discharges his duties of employment
during working hours and on his employer's premises. 2 7 Ordinarily if
he is injured after his working hours or while he is engaged in personal
pursuits, whether on the public highway or elsewhere, the injury is
not compensable. 28 Risks that are incidental to employment however
20Shelton v. Standard Insurance Company, 389 S.W.2d 290, 292 (Tex. Sup. 1965);
Texas General Indemnity Company v. Bottom, 365 S.W.2d 350, 352-3 (Tex. Sup. 1963);
Smith v. Texas Employers' Insurance Association, 129 Tex. 573, 105 S.W.2d 192, 193
(1937); Texas Indemnity Insurance Company v. Clark, 125 Tex. 96, 81 S.W.2d 67, 69
(1935); Aetna Life Insurance Company v. Burnett, 283 S.W. 783, 784 (Tex. Comm'n App.
1926, jdgmt adopted); Liberty Mutual Insurance Company v. Preston, 399 S.W.2d 367,
372 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
21 Cassell v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, 115 Tex. 371, 283 S.W. 127,
46 A.L.R. 1137 (1926); the court in United States Casualty Company v. Hampton, 293
S.W. 260, 262 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1927, no writ) stated that:
The words "out of" point to origin and cause of accident or injury; words "in course
of" to time, place, and circumstances under which the accident or injury takes place.
22Lumberman's Reciprocal Association v. Behnken, 112 Tex. 103, 246 S.W. 72 (1922);
Consolidated Underwriters v. Saxon, 250 S.W. 447 ('Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1923, rev'd
on other grounds, 265 S.W. 143).
23 Cudahy Packing Co. of Nebraska v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418, 44 S.Ct. 153, 68 L. Ed.
366 (1923).
24 United Employers Casualty Company v. Barker, 148 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Civ. App.San Antonio 1941, no writ).
25 Gulf Casualty Company v. Tucker, 201 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1947,
no writ); Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Andrews, 130 Tex. 502, 110 S.W.2d
49 (1937); Cudahy Packing Co. of Nebraska v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418, 44 S. Ct. 153,
68 L. Ed. 366 (1923).
26 American Motorists Insurance Company v. Steel, 229 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. Civ. App.Fort Worth 1950, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
27 Royalty Indemnity Company v. Madrigal, 14 S.W.2d 106 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1929, no writ); Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Herron, 29 S.W.2d 524 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Waco 1930, writ dism'd by agr.); Kinard v. American Employers Insurance
Company, 318 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1958, writ rei'd), 56 A.L.R. 859
(1928), 69 A.L.R. 1121 (1930).
28 Cases cited note 27 supra.
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are not always so circumscribed as to time and place. 29 The statute

does not require that the injury be sustained on the employer's premises to be compensable.3 0 It is sufficient that the injury results from a
risk necessarily, ordinarily, or reasonably inherent in or incident to the
conduct of the work."' The mere fact that an injury was sustained on
a highway and not on employer's premises will not necessarily preclude recovery; recovery is available if the injury meets the require82
ments of the statute.
IV.

TRAVEL AND TRANSPORTATION-ARTICLE

8309, SEC. lb

The law governing transportation or travel as the basis for the employee's claim in Texas is found in Article 8309, section lb.3

3

Section

lb was added to the Texas Workmen's Compensation Act as an amendment by the 1957 Legislature in an attempt to clarify the rules set out
in numerous cases involving travel and transportation. The Fifth Circuit in North River Insurance Company v. Hubbard 4 viewed section
lb as a reconciliation of the section I tests with the special problems
of travel risks. The court said two common law rules of compensation
have proven to be less than harmonious, namely: (1) injuries received
while using the public highways in going and coming from work are
not compensable under the workmen's compensation acts because all
members of the traveling public take such risks,3 5 and (2) Workmen's
Compensation statutes should be construed liberally to carry out their
intended purpose.3 6 The Texas Legislature seemingly saw in the gen29 Lumberman's Reciprocal Association v. Behnken, 112 Tex. 103, 21l6 S.W. 72 (1922);
Federal Surety Company v. Ragle, 40 S.W.2d 63 (Tex. Comm'n App.-1931, judgmt
adopted); Employers' Liability Assurance Corporation v. Light, 275 S.W. 685 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1925, writ ref'd); Fidelity Union Casualty Company v. Hammock, 5 S.W.2d
812 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1928, writ dism'd); Petroleum Casualty Company v.
Green, 11 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1928, writ ref'd); Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Herron, 29 S.W.2d 524 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1930, writ dism'd by
agr.); Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Anderson, 125 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1939 no writ); Maryland Casualty Company v. Kramer, 62 F.2d 295 (5th
Cir. 1932); Mosley v. Royal Indemnity Company, 68 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1934).
30 TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN., art. 8309, § 1 (1959).
3'Fidelity Union Casualty Company v. Hammock, 5 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App.Galveston 1928, writ dism'd); Petroleum Casualty Company v. Green, 11 S.W.2d 388 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Waco 1928, writ ref'd); Columbia Casualty Company v. Kee, 11 S.W.2d 529
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1928, no writ); St. Paul Mercury Insurance Company v.
Dorman, 341 S.W.2d 480 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Employers
Mutual Liability Insurance Company of Wisconsin v. Konvicka, 99 F. Supp. 433 (S.D.
Texas 1951); Lumberman's Reciprocal Association v. Behnken, 112 Tex. 103, 246 S.W. 72
(1922).
32 Shaver v. Allstate Insurance Company, 289 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1956, no writ); Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Company of Wisconsin v. Konvicka,
197 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1952).
33 TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN., art. 8309, § lb (1957).
34 391 F.2d 863, 866 (5th Cir. 1968).
35 Texas General Indemnity Company v. Bottom, 365 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. Sup. 1963).
36 Shelton v. Standard Insurance Company, 389 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. Sup. 1965).
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eral terms of section 1 and in the above common law rules a potential
for misuse of interpretive imagination, whether in awarding recovery
or denying it. Thus, they enacted section lb to restrict judicial analysis
to travel-oriented standards." The Supreme Court in Texas General
Indemnity Company v. Bottom,8 8 in construing section lb, stated that,
when the provisions of section lb are read in connection with
those of section 1 and our decisions construing and applying the
same, we think the Legislature intended thereby to circumscribe
the probative effect that might be given to the means of transportation or the purpose of the journey rather than to enlarge the
definition found in section 1.89
Section lb of article 8309 did not change the existing rule with regard to risks and hazards of travel. An injury occurring in the use of
the public streets or highways while going to and returning from the
place of employment is noncompensable. 40 The rationale of the rule as
stated in Bottom is:
in most instances such an injury is suffered as a consequence of
risks and hazards to which all members of the traveling public are
subject, rather than risks and hazards having to do with and originating in the work or business of the employer.
The recognized exceptions to the general travel rule were changed,
North River Insurance Company v. Hubbard, 391 F.2d 863 (5th Cir. 1968).
365 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. Sup. 1963).
Id. at 353.
Smith v. Texas Employers' Insurance Association, 129 Tex. 573, 105 S.W.2d 192
(1937); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company v. Flanagan, 134 Tex. 374, 136 S.W.2d
210 (1940); Safety Casualty Company v. Wright, 138 Tex. 492, 160 S.W.2d 238 (1942);
Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Inge, 146 Tex. 347, 208 S.W.2d 867 (1948);
American General Insurance Company v. Coleman, 157 Tex. 377, 303 S.W.2d 370 (1957);
Texas General Indemnity Company v. Bottom, 365 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. Sup. 1963); American Indemnity Company v. Dinkins, 322 S.W. 949 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1919, writ
ref'd); Boatright v. Georgia Casualty Company, 277 S.W. 802 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1925, writ dism'd); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Palmer, 286 S.W. 283 (Tex. Civ. App.Austin 1926, writ ref'd); Columbia Casualty Company v. Kee, 11 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1928, no writ); Royal Indemnity Company v. Madrigal, 14 S.W.2d 106
(rex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1929, no writ); Sullivan v. Maryland Casualty Co., 82 S.W.2d
1088 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1935, writ ref'd); Republic Underwriters v. Terrell, 126
S.W.2d 752 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1939, no writ); Insurors Indemnity &cInsurance
Company v. Lankford, 150 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1941, no writ); Texas
Employers Insurance Association v. Grammar, 157 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1941, writ ref'd w.o.m.); Bozant v. Federal Underwriters Exchange, 159 S.W.2d 973 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Galveston, 1942, writ ref'd w.o.m.); Jasper v. Texas Employers Insurance
Association, 206 S.W.2d 646 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1947, no writ); Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Beach, 213 S.W.2d 60 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1948, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Jones v. Texas Indemnity Insurance Company, 223 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. Civ. App.El Paso 1949, writ ref'd); Oefinger v. Texas Employers' Insurance Association, 243 S.W.2d
469 '(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1951, writ ref'd); Henshaw v. Texas Employers' Insurance Association, 282 S.W.2d 928 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Maryland Casualty Company v. Thomas, 367 S.W.2d 407 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1963, writ rei'd); Janak v. Texas Employers' Insurance Association, 381 S.W.2d 176 (Tex.
Sup. 1964).
87
38
89
40

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2018

5

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 1 [2018], No. 1, Art. 6

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1: 89

however, by the 1957 amendment and the tests of section 1 were reconciled and enumerated into four exceptions in the first part of section
lb.
V.

GOING

&

COMING AND DUAL PURPOSE RULES

Article 8309, section lb 4' provides that an employee, while traveling,
will be considered in the course and scope of employment if the injury occurred under one of the following circumstances: (1) if the
transportation is furnished as a part of the contract of employment;
(2) if the transportation is paid for by the employer; (3) if the means
of transportation are under the control of the employer; (4) if the employee has been directed in his employment to proceed from one place
to another. This specific section in the statute is referred to as the "going and coming" rule.
Section lb also changed the general rule that allowed compensation
in instances where the employee was traveling public streets or highways and there was a joint purpose for the trip. This second part of
section lb is called the "dual purpose" rule and provides:
Travel by an employee in the furtherance of the affairs or business
of his employer shall not be the basis for a claim that an injury
occurring during the course of such travel is sustained in the
course of employment, if said travel is also in furtherance of personal or private affairs of the employee, unless the trip to the
place of occurrence of said injury would have been made even had
there been no personal or private affairs of the employee to be
furthered by said trip, and unless said trip would not have been
made had there been no affairs of business of the employer to be
furthered by said trip.
The generally adopted "going and coming" rule has received criticism from a number of authors as being a court made rule that has
been swallowed by the great number of exceptions to it. Mr. Horowitz42 states that the great majority of workmen's compensation acts
41 TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309 § lb (1957) provides:
Unless transportation is furnished as a part of the contract of employment or is
paid for by the employer, or unless the means of such transportation are under the
control of the employer, or unless the employee is directed in his employment to
proceed from one place to another place, such transportation shall not be the basis
for a claim that an injury occurring during the course of such transportation is
sustained in the course of employment. Travel by an employee in the furtherance of
the affairs or business of his employer shall not be the basis for a claim that an

injury occurring during the course of such travel is sustained in the course of employment, if said travel is also in furtherance of personal or private affairs of the
employee, unless the trip to the place of occurrence of said injury would have been
made even had there been no personal or private affairs of the employee to be furthered by said trip, and unless said trip would not have been made had there been

no affairs or business of the employer to be furthered by said trip.
42 14 NACCA L.J. 36 (1954).
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have no provisions or stipulations concerning "going to work" or
"coming from work," but that the courts by judicial fiat through the
years have read into the acts the general rule that injuries sustained in
"going to or from work" are not compensable. Mr. Horowitz says the
rule was adopted through repetition in order to avoid the necessity of
deciding each case on its own merits.
A phrase begins life as a literary expression; its felicity leads to a
lazy repetition, and repetition soon establishes it as a legal formula, indiscriminately
used to express different and sometimes
43
ideas.
contradictory
No sooner was this artificial court created rule laid down than judges
recognized the need for exceptions. Numerous exceptions have been
adopted to this rule and other exceptions undoubtedly are equally
justified, depending on their own peculiar circumstances. The excepto such a point that it
tions have thus encompassed the general rule
44
is no longer useful and should be abolished.
The rule has been a source of injustice to injured workers for
many years. It has put upon them the burden of proving an exception to this narrow court-made rule. It should be abandoned
in favor of deciding liberally in each case whether the journey and
injury in question arose 'in the course of' the employment. The
rule has been abandoned in many foreign countries, and workers
are protected while going to and from work as if they were on
paid time. Today, because of speeding automobiles, the journey
to and from work may be the most dangerous part of the employcompensation should be afment. The protection of workmen's
45
forded during such journeys.
Whatever the argument concerning the "going and coming" rule,
Texas coincides with the majority of states in following the general
rule with the various exceptions thereto as enumerated in section lb.
The second part of section lb referred to as the "dual purpose" rule
has presented itself as rather a prolific and troublesome doctrine. The
universally accepted test in applying the "dual purpose" rule is found
in Marks' Dependents v. Gray.40 Chief Justice Cardozo writing for
the court said:
The test in brief is this: If the work of the employee creates the
necessity for travel, he is in the course of his employment, though
43 Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 68, 63 S. Ct. 444, 452, 87 L. Ed.
495, 618 (1942).
44 14 NACCA L.J. 36, 41 (1954).
45 Horowitz, Workmen's Compensation: Half Century of judicial Developments, 41
NaB. L. REv. 1, 52.
46251 N.Y. 90, 167 N.E. 181 (1929).
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he is serving at the same time some purpose of his own. If however, the work has no part in creating the necessity for travel, if
the journey would have gone forward though the business errand
had been dropped, and would have been canceled upon failure
of the private purpose, though the business errand
was undone,
47
the travel is then personal, and personal the risk.
Mr. Larson makes the interesting point in his treatise that the test announced by Cardozo, with one amplification, will apply to "coming
and going" trips as well as out-of-town trips under Marks' v. Gray.
Larson believes that it is not necessary that,
on failure of the personal motive, the business trip would have
been taken by this particular employee at this particular time. It
is enough that someone sometime would have had to take the trip
to carry out the business mission. Perhaps another employee
would have done it; perhaps another time would have been
chosen; but if a special trip would have had to be made for this
purpose, and if the employer got this necessary item of travel accomplished by combining it with this employee's personal trip, it
is accurate to say that it was a concurrent cause 4 of the trip, rather
than an incidental appendage or after thought.
49
Although the above amplification is approved in other jurisdictions,
it has not been authoritatively adopted in Texas in regard to "coming
and going" travel. 0 In a recent Texas case, the Supreme Court stated
that the Legislature expressly rejected this idea in the "dual purpose"
section of lb. 51 The language in section lb requires an evaluation of
the personal and business purposes of a dual purpose trip in determining whether an injury to the particular employee making the particular trip occurs in the course of employment.5 2 Texas, following the
majority of states, applies the test set out in Marks' v. Gray through the
wording of section lb of its Workmen's Compensation Act.

VI. APPLICATION OF ART. 8309, SEC. lb
The leading Texas case construing article 8309, section lb is Janak
v. Texas Employers' Insurance Association.53 In Janak, the claimant
was a member of a drilling crew and participated in a carpool arrange47 Id. at 183.
48 1 Larson, Workman's Compensation Law, 294.10-11, § 18.13 (1968).
49 Brown v. Arapahoe Drilling Company, 70 N.M. 99, 370 P.2d 816 (1962).

50Janak v. Texas Employers Insurance Association, 381 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. Sup. 1964);
Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Knipe, 150 Tex. 313, 239 S.W.2d 1006 (1951);
Jones v. Texas Indemnity Insurance Company, 223 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1949, writ ref'd); Insurors Indemnity & Insurance Company v. Lankford, 150 S.W.2d 288
(Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1941, no writ).

51 Janak v. Texas Employers Insurance Association, 381 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. Sup. 1964).
52 Id.
53 Id.
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ment. At the time of the accident, Janak was a passenger in a car
owned and operated by a fellow crew member. Two routes were available from Yorktown, Texas, one to the north through Gillett, Texas,
and the other to the south through Runge, Texas. The Gillet route
was more convenient, but the crew took the Runge route in order
to purchase ice for drinking water. The court of civil appeals held that
there was no evidence to support the jury's finding that Janak was in
the course and scope of employment when injured; but rather he was
a passenger, traveling only in furtherance of his personal business. The
Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that a drilling crew
member was not precluded from recovering workmen's compensation
by the mere fact he was a passenger member of an employee's carpool
if the owner-operator of the automobile, by procuring ice for the
drinking water, was performing services in furtherance of the employer's business.
Texas courts have found that drinking water in a situation similar
to Janak was a necessary facility of the employer's premises and the
employer, of necessity, would have to make arrangements to furnish
the ice water. 54 The drinking water was reasonably essential to the
continuation of the drilling operations to such a point that a deviation to obtain it is impliedly directed by the employer. 55 This implied
directive is the basis of the Court's holding that the employee by
deviating to obtain ice water was performing services in furtherance
of the employer's business. The Court in Janak said that perhaps the
ice water was not absolutely essential to continuation of the drilling
operation, but it is sound to say that it was reasonably essential to
a satisfactory continuation thereof.50 The Court compared the necessity for a deviation to obtain ice water to the necessity in "personal
comfort" cases in which employees turn aside f6om their work to get
57
a drink, get warm, get fresh air or go to a restroom.

The Janak case made a distinction in whether there was a deviation
in order to obtain the ice or whether it was picked up on a direct
route to work. 5s If the ice was obtained while traveling on their
regular, direct route, the employees would not meet the test laid
down in Marks' Dependents v. Gray as their motives would be deemed
personal. If there is a deviation from the regular and direct route,
54 Travelers Insurance Company v. Forson, 268 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Janak v. Texas Employers' Insurance Association, 381 S.W.2d 176
(Tex. Sup. 1964).
55Janak v. Texas Employers' Insurance Association, 381 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. Sup. 1964).
56ld. at 182.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 180.
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however, then the personal matter will be combined with a business
matter and it will come under the "dual purpose" test of Marks.
The Supreme Court in Janak discussed the usefulness and importance of a carpool:
It is a matter of common knowledge that travel in carpools has
become an important economic facet of our modern society.
This is particularly so among business and industrial employees
and workers. By traveling in car pools they reduce their individual expenses which are job-connected and increase their wages
usable for personal and family needs, thus making demands on
the employer for increased wages less urgent. 59
The Court refused to recognize a distinction between the automobile owner-operator and a passenger in allowing compensation in
a carpool case. Earlier cases had limited compensation to only the
owner-operator of the automobile and not its passengers. 60 But Janak
expressly rejected this ruling:
If on a particular trip the automobile-operator member of a
carpool must perform a service in furtherance of the employer's
business, the others must go also or abandon the carpool. To
expect them to abandon the carpool if the deviation is not extreme is utterly unrealistic; and it is also unrealistic, therefore,
to draw an imaginary line between the crew member who operates the automobile and the crew member who is but a passenger
and say that the one is entitled to compensation benefits if
injured but the other is not."'
The obligation to procure and transport ice and water in a carpool
is the obligation of all the crew members each day, and the private
arrangement between the members by which one assumed primary responsibility for discharging the obligation on that particular day does
not change the situation.0 2
The Texas courts since Janak have applied the provisions of article
8309, section lb to cases involving travel under different circumstances. 3 In applying the rules governing injuries sustained in travel,
it must not be forgotten that each case must be decided upon its par64
ticular facts.
at 179.
60 Travelers Insurance Company v. Forson, 268 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
61 Janak v. Texas Employers Insurance Association, 381 S.W.2d 176, 179 (rex. Sup.
1964).
62 Id.
63 Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Adams, 381 S.W.2d 340 (rex. Civ. App.Texarkana 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Shelton v. Standard Insurance Company,. 389 S.W.2d
290 (rex. Sup. 1965).
64 Wynn v. Southern Surety, 26 S.W.2d 691 (rex. Civ. App.-Waco 1930, writ ref'd);
59 Id.
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The case of Hackfeld v. Pacific Employers Insurance Company65
presented a fact situation similar to the Janak case. The deceased in
Hackfeld was a member of a drilling crew engaged in a carpool arrangement. On the day of the accident, the deceased was a passenger
in an automobile belonging to one of his fellow crew members. At
the time of the accident, the crew was returning from the drill site
after completing their day's work. An empty water can furnished by
the employer was found at the scene of the accident. The morning prior
to the accident, the employees obtained ice and water for the drilling
crew without deviating from the regular route.
The court in Hackfeld did not follow Janak. It determined that the
deceased was simply on a personal mission of returning home from
work at the time of the accident. The evidence showed the employee's
wages stopped at the moment he left the rig floor, and that going to
and from work was a personal matter of the crew members. Some
courts have regarded carpools as being personal arrangements for the
benefit of the employees which do not come within the business of the
employer. 6 Janak allowed compensation because it was found that the
claimant was not returning, but was on his way to work and the driver
of the car deviated from the most direct route to pick up ice and
water. This deviation under the circumstances was shown to be in furtherance of the employer's business.
The Supreme Court in Agriculture Insurance Company v. Dryden6"
denied compensation to a foreman of a carpenter crew who was injured while on the way to work when his car overturned after suddenly swerving to avoid hitting a dog. On the morning of the accident,
the foreman was transporting tools, for his employer, to the work site.
The tools were being delivered by Dryden pursuant to his employer's
instructions given the previous day.
The Court refused to sustain Dryden's allegation that he had been
directed to proceed from one place to another by his employer. The
Court reasoned that an injury occurring during transportation will not
support a claim that it was sustained in the course of employment unless one of the prerequisites of article 8309, section lb is present. The
first three exceptions to the rule were not applicable but the application of the fourth exception, dealing with a directive by the employer
to proceed from one place to another, was raised. The Court held that
his subjection to traffic hazards while driving to and from work was
Cercy v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 142 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1940, writ
ref'd).
65 393 S.W.2d 720 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1965, no writ).
66janak v. Texas Employers' Insurance Association, 381 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. Sup. 1964);
Jecker v. Western Alliance Insurance Company, 369 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. Sup. 1963); Travelers Insurance Company v. Forson, 268 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1954,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
67 398 S.W.2d 745 (rex. Sup. 1965).
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not the result of, or caused by, any direction of his employer. There
was no specific mission assigned which required any travel by him
apart from, or in addition to, his regular and personal transportation
to and from work.
Justice Pope in concurring"' stated that Dryden was directed to proceed from one place to another to deliver the tools but he failed to
meet the requirements of the "dual purpose" test. Dryden met the
first test in that the trip would have been made even had there been
no personal or private affairs to be furthered by the trip. He failed,
however, to meet the most difficult test: to prove that the trip would
not have been made had there been no affairs or business of the employer to be furthered.6 9
Justice Smith based his dissent 70 on the fact that the usual means of
transporting the tools was unavailable, therefore Dryden was hired to
transport them. In doing so, the employer directed Dryden to proceed
from one place to another, thus the transportation was under the control of the employer. Justice Smith contrasted the Janak case where
the employer knew he must get ice water to the drill site for his employees, therefore there was an implied directive for the employees to
bring it to the well site. Likewise, in Dryden, the employer knew the
carpenters must have the proper tools to properly and adequately perform their duties. Therefore, the transportation of the tools by Dryden
was under the complete direction and control of the employer.
The implied directive concept set out in Janak was followed in the
recent Supreme Court decision of Meyer v. Western Fire Insurance
Company.7'1 Meyer was employed as a service supervisor for a home
builder. He worked irregular hours, partly at home, partly at his employer's office, and partly in making service calls and inspections of the
various homes built by his employer. He was given discretion, except
upon emergency calls from his employer's office, to determine when
and where to make service calls for his employer. His duties did not
require him to report to the office daily or at any particular time. On
the day of the accident, he had done some paper work at home and
had left to make calls at a subdivision. Although he was not required
to report to the office and had no duties to perform there, he decided
to drive by the office on his way to the subdivision to determine
whether there were any service calls in the subdivision area. The accident occurred before he reached the office.
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the cause saying the
court of civil appeals erred in granting summary judgment because the
68 Agriculture Insurance Company v. Dryden, 398 S.W.2d 745, 747 (Tex. Sup. 1965).
69 Id.
70 Id.
71

425 S.W.2d 628 (Tex. Sup. 1968).
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circumstances of the case created a fact issue whether he was injured
in the course of employment. The Supreme Court was of the opinion
that the adoption of article 8309, section lb did not abolish the exceptions of express and implied conditions in the employment contract on
travel situations. It was stated:
But the Legislature surely did not intend to provide that an employee whose employment requires him to travel at his own
expense in his own automobile on streets and highways, either
constantly or intermittently, should be denied compensation if accidently injured while thus exposed to risks growing out of his
employment. Any such holding would be wholly unjust to salesmen, servicemen, repairmen, deliverymen, and a host of others
who may be required to use their own automobiles in their work,
and would be a strict rather than a liberal interpretation of the
72
Workmen's Compensation Act.

The Court held there was evidence that Meyer's duties as a service
supervisor required him to travel from place to place in order to discharge the duties of his employment. Thus, there was evidence that he
was impliedly directed to travel to make his service calls on the morning of the accident, and injuries sustained while furthering his employer's business by making such service calls would be compensable
under section lb.
This court also followed Janak in holding that if Meyer merely deviated to his employer's office to determine whether there were any
additional duties he could perform in the neighborhood of his planned
service calls, the deviation would not be for personal reasons. The deviation would be in furtherance of the employer's business and impliedly directed by the employer as the most efficient manner of performing his duties as service supervisor.
The case of Cannedy v. Reliance Insurance Company73 involved a
claim by the parents of an injured newsboy against the publisher's insurer for workmen's compensation as a result of injuries sustained by
their son while collecting two delinquent accounts. The evidence
showed that the boy was billed in advance by the publisher on the
basis of the previous month's average daily delivery. The collections
for the deliveries were found to be strictly the responsibility of the carrier and his gross income was the difference between the amount paid
for the papers and the amount collected.
The court held that the injury sustained was not of the kind and
character having to do with and originating in the work, business,
72 Meyer v. Western Fire Insurance Company, 425 S.W.2d 628, 630 (Tex. Sup. 1968);
Jecker v. Western Alliance Insurance Company, 369 S.W.2d 776, 779 (Tex. Sup. 1963).
73 425 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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trade or profession of the employer nor received while engaged in or
about the furtherance of the affairs or business of the employer. Therefore, there could be no implied directive by the employer to the employee when the reasons for the travel are purely personal to the employee.7 4 The carrier also failed the "dual purpose" test of section lb
because the trip was for his own benefit and personal reasons. The
court held that the claimant did not meet the prescribed requirements
so as to place himself in the course of employment.
75
The claimant in Texas Employers' InsuranceAssociation v. Clauder
attempted to apply the "access" exception to the general "going and
coming" rule. The deceased was working as an oil operator at the plant
of his employer on the day of the accident. He had finished his duties
for the day and had left the premises in his own automobile and was
proceeding home over one of several exit roads over the well lease
when he was killed in a collision with another automobile.
The court stated that although the claimant did not attempt to bring
the claim under any of the provisions of section lb, the "going and
coming" rule was applicable. In seeking recovery, the claimant must
come under the provisions of section lb.76 The claimant based the
claim on the "access" exception to the rule governing injuries suffered
while using public streets.7 7 Under this exception, a workman who has
been injured at a place intended by the employer for use as a means of
ingress and egress to and from the actual place of the employee's work
has been held to have been injured in the course of employment. The
courts have said that these "access" areas are so closely related to the
employer's premises as to be fairly treated as a part thereof. 78 The "access" doctrine has been recognized and applied by the courts, but it is
generally held that in order to authorize a recovery, it is ordinarily
essential that the way traveled should be the only way to and from the
work and also that it should not be traveled by the public generally.
The court thus concluded that this case was not one for the application of the "access" doctrine but rather a travel case under section lb.
The recent Supreme Court decision of Johnson v. Pacific Employers
Indemnity Company79 involved a fact situation similar to Janak. John74

Id.

75 431 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

Id.
Lumberman's Reciprocal Association v. Behnken, 112 Tex. 103, 246 S.W. 72 (1922);
Kelty v. Travelers Insurance Company, 391 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1965,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Meyer v. Western Fire Insurance Company, 425 S.W.2d 628 (Tex. Sup.
1968).
78 Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Clauder, 431 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Tyler 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
76
77
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son, an employee of a drilling company had two routes available in
traveling to work. His usual and most convenient route was the Liberty
Dayton route. The other route which Johnson would sometimes travel
was the Conroe route. Johnson joined a carpool at the "request" of his
boss. It was customary for members of the carpool to purchase ice and
water for the drilling crew on the way to the drill site. As a member of
the carpool Johnson drove every fourth day. He would first pick up his
boss, then the ice and the two other crew members in Conroe. On the
day in question Johnson was injured while traveling the Conroe route
before he reached his boss's home or picked up the ice and water.
The Supreme Court held that the court of civil appeals erred in
finding as a matter of law that Johnson deviated from his regular route
of travel solely for his personal benefit.80
The Supreme Court also held that Johnson's injuries were compensable as he was traveling an alternate route in the course of his
employment at the direction of his employer. The dual-purpose provision of article 8309 section lb was held to be inapplicable in this situation in that Johnson acted on the directions of his employer. The
Court stated:
We held in Janak v. Texas Employers' Insurance Association, 381
S.W. 2d 176 (Tex. Sup. 1964), that the transporting of ice to a
drilling rig is in furtherance of the employer's business. We now
hold that it is also in furtherance of the employer's business that
the transportation be under circumstances which will give assurance to the members of the drilling crew that the ice and water
will be available at the beginning of the work day."'
VII.

CONCLUSION

The increasing case law on employee travel and inconsistency in decisions involving transportation and travel injuries prompted the Texas
Legislature in 1957 to enact section lb to article 8309. The amendment has been viewed as a reconciliation of the section 1 tests regarding course and scope of employment with the special problems of travel
risks. 82 The Texas Legislature seemingly viewed the broad terms of
section 1 and the necessity of controlling the interpretative imagination of the courts and enacted section lb to restrict the judicial anal79 12 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 319 (April 9, 1969).
80 Pacific Employers Indemnity Co. v. Johnson, 431 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. Civ. App.Beaumont 1968, writ granted).
81 Johnson v. Pacific Employers Indemnity Co., 12 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 319, 322 (April 9,
1969).
82 North River Insurance Company v. Hubbard, 391 F.2d 863 (5th Cir. 1968).
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ysis to travel-oriented standards. 8 The Legislature introduced guidelines in order to give the courts a directive in cases involving the
enumerable situations arising in transportation injuries. The recent
cases involving transportation and travel illustrate the vastness of the
area and the recurring problems with which the courts are faced today.
83

Id.
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